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Abstract English law’s traditional approach to the admissibility of improperly
obtained evidence is currently being rethought in response to a range of
domestic and international pressures. With the position in England and Wales
following the House of Lords’ decision in A and Others (2005) firmly in mind, this
article undertakes a selective review of comparative approaches to the admissi-
bility of improperly obtained evidence in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
Having analysed relevant legislation and case law in each jurisdiction, general
principles are derived to guide future developments in English law, in
conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights.
n this article we offer, from the perspective of academic lawyers in
England and Wales, some thoughts on recent developments in Common-
wealth jurisdictions on the treatment of evidence that has beenI
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obtained illegally or otherwise improperly, but the reliability of which is not
disputed.1 Rules regulating evidence-gathering are an acknowledgement that the
need to protect the public from crime should be balanced against a general
principle of procedural fairness.2 Once relevant, reliable evidence has been
uncovered as a result of official rule-breaking, there will be a fundamental shift in
this balance. The general theory of procedural rights, which guarantees
protection to suspects from improper treatment, will now be in conflict with the
public interest in convicting the guilty and in preventing crime. Resolving such a
conflict amounts to ‘a choice of policy about the protection of civil liberties’.3
Our discussion of recent developments in the Commonwealth will be selective
rather than comprehensive, focusing on issues which in some way illuminate the
debate on improperly obtained evidence in England and Wales. An examination of
developments in Commonwealth jurisdictions is particularly timely for two
reasons. First, the debate on improperly obtained evidence has recently resurfaced
in England and Wales as a result of the decision of the House of Lords on evidence
obtained by torture.4 Secondly, as will be demonstrated below, English law has
become increasingly reliant, for its approach to improperly obtained evidence, on
the guarantee of the right to a ‘fair trial’ in Article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, and the associated jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights. Developments in the other major Commonwealth jurisdictions in
relation to improperly obtained evidence have attracted somewhat limited
judicial and academic attention in England and Wales, resulting in the failure to
learn a number of valuable lessons from these developments, not least for the
interpretation of Article 6 itself.
1. The position in England and Wales: where are we now?
The House of Lords in A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department5 appears
to have accepted that in appropriate circumstances the manner in which evidence
is obtained could render it inadmissible in judicial proceedings, notwithstanding
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1 We are grateful for the helpful comments of participants at the Matrix Chambers seminar, where
an earlier version of this article was first presented in December 2003.
2 It may be argued ‘that by imposing these restrictions the state has staked out the boundaries for
lawful access to evidence and has indicated that beyond these limits it is willing to forego evidence
of crime in deference to individual freedom’: A. A. S. Zuckerman, The Principles of Criminal Evidence
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989) 346.
3 Ibid. at 347.
4 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC 221, discussed
below.
5 Ibid. See N. Grief, ‘The Exclusion of Foreign Torture Evidence: A Qualified Victory for the Rule of
Law’ [2006] European Human Rights Law Review 201; N. Rasiah, ‘A v Secretary of State for the Home
Department (No. 2): Occupying the Moral High Ground?’ (2006) 69 MLR 995.
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its source or reliability. This seems wholly inconsistent with the conventional
approach to the treatment of improperly obtained evidence which we discuss
below.6 The question for consideration in A and Others was whether statements
obtained by torture by non-UK authorities could be used in appeals to the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission. The Secretary of State argued that there was no
rule in English law precluding the use of such statements as evidence.7 While
there was some disagreement on the test for exclusion, the seven Law Lords unani-
mously rejected any suggestion that evidence obtained by torture could ever be
used as evidence in an English court.8 Focusing on the constitutional importance
of this decision, Lord Bingham was reluctant to treat the issue as an argument
about the law of evidence, which in his opinion would trivialise it.9 Nevertheless,
the ruling in A and Others sheds some light on current judicial thinking in England
and Wales on improperly obtained evidence. Although A and Others concerned
evidence of statements, which carry obvious dangers of unreliability, the Law
Lords clearly assumed that their ruling would cover any evidence. The rationale for
excluding evidence on the ground of its inherent unreliability requires little
explanation.10 The reasoning behind the exclusion of relevant, reliable and
possibly crucial evidence on the ground that it was obtained in an offensive
manner is, however, more opaque and involves consideration of the ethical and
moral dimensions of criminal adjudication.
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6 See generally A. J. Ashworth, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights’ [1977] Crim LR 723; A. L.-T.
Choo and S. Nash, ‘What’s the Matter with Section 78?’ [1999] Crim LR 929; I. H. Dennis, ‘Recon-
structing the Law of Criminal Evidence’ (1989) 42 Current Legal Problems 21; K. Grevling, ‘Fairness
and the Exclusion of Evidence under Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act’ (1997)
113 LQR 667.
7 The Secretary of State did not suggest that evidence obtained by torture in the United Kingdom
was admissible. He argued that any exclusionary rule was confined to cases in which agents of the
United Kingdom were involved.
8 The Secretary of State argued that the party seeking to have evidence excluded should be
required to establish factual grounds for the challenge to its admissibility. Lords Hope,
Rodger, Carswell and Brown considered that once a detainee had raised the issue of torture,
the onus to investigate the matter passed to the Commission. Evidence should not be admitted if
the Commission concludes on the balance of probabilities that it was obtained by torture.
However, if the Commission ‘is left in doubt as to whether the evidence was obtained in this way’
(at [118], per Lord Hope), it should be admitted. Disagreeing with the majority, Lords Bingham,
Nicholls and Hoffmann were of the opinion that, provided it is plausible that evidence has been
obtained by torture, the evidence should be excluded unless the Commission is able ‘to conclude
that there is not a real risk that the evidence has been obtained by torture’ (at [56], per Lord
Bingham).
9 [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC 221 at [51].
10 A. J. Ashworth, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights’ [1977] Crim LR 723 at 723–4;
W. Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 2006) ch. 6.
While there is no automatic exclusionary rule for improperly obtained evidence in
English law,11 the courts have accepted that improperly obtained evidence can be
excluded in the exercise of discretion if its use would render the trial unfair.
Explaining the mechanisms used in England and Wales to guarantee a fair trial, Lord
Bingham observed:
The institutions and procedures established to ensure that a criminal
trial is fair vary almost infinitely from one jurisdiction to another, the
product, no doubt, of historical, cultural and legal tradition. In some
countries provision is made for judicial oversight of criminal investi-
gations. That is, for better or worse, entirely contrary to British
practice. Instead, the achievement of fairness in a trial on indictment
rests above all on the correct and conscientious performance of their
roles by judge, prosecuting counsel, defending counsel and jury. Save
in defined circumstances … the judge is not a factual decision-maker.
His task is to ensure that the trial is conducted in a fair and
even-handed way. For this latter purpose he is entrusted with
numerous discretions …12
The trial judge has discretionary powers to exclude improperly obtained evidence
under the general common law duty to ensure a fair trial, and under s. 78(1) of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (‘PACE’) which provides that prosecution
evidence may be excluded if its admission would affect the fairness of the
proceedings.13
The common law exclusionary discretion is narrow and has generally been limited to
excluding evidence of questionable relevance or improperly obtained confessions.14
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11 In Kuruma v R [1955] AC 197 at 203 the Privy Council held that ‘the test to be applied in considering
whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is
admissible and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained.’ See generally J. D.
Heydon, ‘Illegally Obtained Evidence (1)’ [1973] Crim LR 603.
12 R v H [2004] UKHL 3, [2004] 2 AC 134 at [13]. See generally D. Ormerod and D. Birch, ‘The Evolution of
the Discretionary Exclusion of Evidence’ [2004] Crim LR 767; R. Pattenden, Judicial Discretion and
Criminal Litigation (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1990).
13 ‘In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to
rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such
an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.’
14 R v Christie [1914] AC 545; Kuruma v R [1955] AC 197; R v Sang [1980] AC 402. Although the extent of
this exclusionary discretion is somewhat uncertain, the courts have demonstrated a willingness to
exclude evidence where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value (Noor Mohamed v R
[1949] AC 182; Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694; Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304) and a reluctance to sanction its
use to secure the exclusion of improperly obtained, but reliable, evidence (R v Sang [1980] AC 402).
The statutory discretion provided by s. 78(1) is also narrowly applied.15 This narrow
application is due mainly to the courts’ restrictive interpretation of the concept of
a ‘fair trial’. While this discretionary power has on occasion been used to exclude
confession evidence, the Court of Appeal has repeatedly refused to accept that the
use of improperly obtained but reliable evidence has adversely affected the fairness
of the trial.16 Consequently, both at common law and under statute, the conven-
tional approach to the problem of improperly obtained non-confession evidence
has been to focus almost exclusively on reliability. Noting the increasingly
‘obscure’ relationship between the unfairness caused to the defendant at the
pre-trial stage by official impropriety, on the one hand, and trial fairness, on the
other, Professor Sir John Smith suggested that the courts were:
still influenced in interpreting section 78 by the common law
discretion which, according to Lord Diplock in Sang, sprang from the
principle that no one can be required to be his own betrayer, an aspect
of the privilege against self-incrimination: ‘That is why there is no
discretion [at common law] to exclude evidence discovered as a result
of an illegal search but there is discretion to exclude evidence which
the accused has been induced to produce voluntarily if the method of
inducement was unfair.’17
Despite the extensive jurisprudence on s. 78(1), the courts have provided minimal
guidance on specific factors that inform a decision on whether improperly
obtained evidence should be excluded in any particular case.18 However, it is
evident from the case law that the quality of the evidence and the factual accuracy
of the verdict are significant factors. The fact that non-confession evidence is
usually reliable is a strong factor affecting its admissibility. Indeed, it has been
suggested that s. 78(1) should not be used to exclude relevant, highly probative
non-confession evidence unless its quality may have been affected by the manner
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15 The Court of Appeal initially made strong statements about the utility of s. 78(1) in addressing
police failure to follow the rules of investigation, but its use has generally been limited to
confession evidence. See e.g. R v Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139; R v Samuel [1988] QB 615; R v Keenan [1990] 2
QB 54; R v Canale [1990] 2 All ER 187.
16 See e.g. R v Cooke [1995] 1 Cr App R 318; R v Khan [1996] 3 All ER 289; R v Chalkley [1998] 2 All ER 155; R v
Sanghera [2001] 1 Cr App R 20 (p. 299); R v Loveridge [2001] EWCA Crim 973, [2001] 2 Cr App R 29 (p.
591).
17 Commentary on R v Khan [1995] QB 27 at [1994] Crim LR 832, quoting from R v Sang [1980] AC 402 at
436.
18 See e.g. M. Hunter, ‘Judicial Discretion: Section 78 in Practice’ [1994] Crim LR 558.
in which it was obtained.19 The appellate courts have maintained this position
even where evidence has been obtained in breach of the right to privacy, which is
guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.20
Excluding evidence merely on account of a breach of Article 8 is seen not only as
contrary to common sense21 but also as having ‘the consequence of interfering
with the achievement of justice’.22
Since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force,23 making it unlawful for courts
and tribunals to act in a manner which is incompatible with a Convention right,
English courts have, in approaching improperly obtained evidence, looked
increasingly to the fair trial guarantees provided by Article 6 of the Convention.24
Article 6 contains both a general right to a fair hearing25 and a number of specific
rights including the right to certain minimum standards of procedural fairness.
In addition, Article 6 has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights
as impliedly incorporating the right to remain silent and the right not to incrim-
inate oneself, which have become ‘generally recognised international standards
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19 In R v Chalkley [1998] 2 All ER 155, the Court of Appeal suggested that the discretion to exclude
evidence on the ground that it had been improperly obtained was limited to confession evidence;
evidence obtained from the accused after the commission of the offence; evidence obtained in an
undercover police operation; and evidence which is of questionable quality as a result of the way it
was obtained. See also R v Bray, unreported, 31 July 1998, in which the Court of Appeal held: ‘Here
the quality of the evidence is simply unaffected by the ... illegality and in our judgment the
decision under section 78 therefore had to go in favour of the prosecution.’
20 Article 8 provides that:
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’
21 In R v Khan [1996] 3 All ER 289 at 302 the House of Lords remarked: ‘It would be a strange reflection
on our law if a man who has admitted his participation in the illegal importation of a large
quantity of heroin should have his conviction set aside on the grounds that his privacy has been
invaded.’
22 R v Sanghera [2001] 1 Cr App R 20 (p. 299) at [17].
23 See generally A. L.-T. Choo and S. Nash, ‘Evidence Law in England and Wales: The Impact of the
Human Rights Act 1998’ (2003) 7 E & P 31.
24 Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom
are obliged to act in a way which is compatible with the rights guaranteed by the European
Convention on Human Rights unless provisions in primary legislation require them to act
differently, and must take into account any relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights.
25 ‘In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.’
which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure’.26 These procedural rights
are deemed necessary to safeguard suspects from oppression and coercion and are
closely linked to the presumption of innocence.27 Accordingly, trial fairness will be
compromised by the admission of evidence obtained in breach of the right against
self-incrimination.28 Similarly, the use of statements obtained from the accused
during an investigation in breach of the right to silence will render the trial
unfair.29 However, the protection afforded by Article 6 in such contexts does not
necessarily extend to all types of evidence.30 A distinction has been drawn between
compelled statements and the production of a pre-existing document or real
evidence.31 While it is considered objectionable to use evidence which the accused
was coerced into creating, using compulsory powers to require the production of
evidence that was already in existence is considered less likely to present a
problem.32
Article 6 does not include any reference to specific evidentiary rules, the
admissibility of evidence being seen as a matter for regulation under national
law.33 The European Court of Human Rights has held that whether the required
standard of trial fairness has been achieved in any particular case will depend
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26 Serves v France (1999) 28 EHRR 265 (judgment of 1997) at [46].
27 Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 313 (judgment of 1996) at [68]. The European Court of
Human Rights held that regardless of whether transcripts obtained under compulsory powers
were directly self-incriminating, the fact that the authorities made use of them in subsequent
criminal proceedings was a violation of Art. 6. The public interest in the prosecution of complex
and serious cases was insufficient to justify the admission of the evidence.
28 Funke v France (1993) 16 EHRR 297; Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 313 (judgment of 1996).
29 In Allan v United Kingdom (2002) 36 EHRR 12 (p. 143), it was found that the use of an informer to
obtain information from a suspect amounted to ‘the functional equivalent of interrogation’ (at
[52]).
30 In Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 313 (judgment of 1996) at [69], it was held that the
privilege against self-incrimination did not extend to ‘material which may be obtained from the
accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of the will
of the suspect such as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and
urine samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing’.
31 Some doubt remains in Convention jurisprudence as to whether the right against self-incrimi-
nation applies to documentary evidence. While in Funke this right attached to bank documents
and chequebooks in the applicant’s possession, in Saunders a distinction was drawn between
compelled statements and real evidence. Evidently preferring Funke to Saunders on this point, the
court in JB v Switzerland, Application No. 31827/96, 3 May 2001, found that a prosecution for failing
to produce possibly incriminatory documents breached Art. 6. For further discussion see A. S.
Butler, ‘Funke v France and the Right against Self-Incrimination: A Critical Analysis’ (2000) 11
Criminal Law Forum 461.
32 See Funke v France (1993) 16 EHRR 297; Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 7 of 2000) [2001] EWCA Crim
888, [2001] 2 Cr App R 19 (p. 286).
33 Schenk v Switzerland (1991) 13 EHRR 242 (judgment of 1988); Ferrantelli v Italy (1997) 23 EHRR 288
(judgment of 1996).
upon its assessment of the proceedings as a whole, which can include con-
sideration of the nature of the evidence and the manner in which it was
obtained.34 Using improperly obtained evidence at trial will not be considered to
infringe Article 6 providing proper procedural safeguards are in place, and the
veracity of the evidence is not in question. This is the position even if the evidence
was obtained in breach of another Convention right. In Khan v United Kingdom,35 for
example, it was held that the trial judge’s refusal to exclude evidence of private
conversations recorded in breach of Article 8 did not interfere with the fairness of
the trial. The contested evidence was a tape-recording of a conversation in which
the applicant acknowledged his involvement in the importation of heroin.
Although critical of the UK Government for failing to ensure that the national law
regulating the use of covert surveillance at the time was Convention compliant, on
the issue of admissibility the court noted that:
the applicant had ample opportunity to challenge both the authen-
ticity and the use of the recording. He did not challenge its
authenticity, but challenged its use at the ‘voire dire’ and again before
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. The Court notes that at
each level of jurisdiction the domestic courts assessed the effect of
admission of the evidence on the fairness of the trial by reference to
section 78 of PACE …36
Focusing on the strength and reliability of the evidence in this case, it was
considered irrelevant that the conviction was based solely on the tape-recording.
The availability of an exclusionary discretion at the domestic level was considered
to provide sufficient guarantees against unfairness.
Support for the introduction of a mandatory exclusionary rule for evidence
obtained in breach of a Convention right can be found in a number of dissenting
opinions. Disagreeing with the majority in Khan on the use of this type of evidence,
Judge Loucaides remarked:
I cannot accept that a trial can be ‘fair’, as required by Article 6, if a
person’s guilt for any offence is established through evidence
obtained in breach of the human rights guaranteed by the
Convention. … I do not think one can speak of a ‘fair’ trial if it is
conducted in breach of the law. … The exclusion of evidence obtained
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34 Kostovski v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 434 (judgment of 1989); Kraska v Switzerland (1994) 18 EHRR
188 (judgment of 1993); Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 45 (p. 1016) (judgment of 2000).
35 (2001) 31 EHRR 45 (p. 1016) (judgment of 2000).
36 Ibid. at [38].
contrary to the protected right to privacy should be considered as an
essential corollary of the right, if such right is to be of any value. …
Breaking the law, in order to enforce it, is a contradiction in terms
and an absurd proposition.37
This view has been endorsed by Judge Tulkens in her dissent on the Article 6 issue
in PG v United Kingdom.38 She asked rhetorically:
Will there come a point at which the majority’s reasoning will be
applied where the evidence has been obtained in breach of other
provisions of the Convention, such as Article 3 [which imposes an
absolute prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment], for example? Where and how should the line be drawn?
According to which hierarchy in the guaranteed rights? Ultimately,
the very notion of fairness in a trial might have a tendency to decline
or become subject to shifting goalposts.39
There is no indication that such powerful dissenting opinions are likely to desta-
bilise the principle established in Khan.40 Subsequent English authority indicates
that appropriate use of the discretionary powers to exclude evidence provided by
domestic law can ensure compliance with Article 6.41 Consequently, the prevailing
position in both domestic and Convention jurisprudence is that improperly
obtained, but apparently reliable, evidence ‘may be inadmissible but is not ipso
facto so. Nor is a trial in which it is relied upon necessarily unfair’.42
The English common law provides a further procedural mechanism to protect
the right to a fair trial. Criminal proceedings can be halted as an abuse of
the process of the court43 if a fair trial is impossible because of unjustifiable
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37 Ibid. at [O-I4], [O-I7], [O-I8].
38 Application No. 44787/98, 25 September 2001.
39 Ibid. at [5] of Judge Tulkens’s opinion.
40 Attempts to distinguish Khan have generally failed. See Elahi v United Kingdom, Application No.
30034/04, 20 June 2006.
41 See e.g. R v Perry, The Times (28 April 2000); R v Sanghera [2001] 1 Cr App R 20 (p. 299); R v P [2001] 2 WLR
463 at 475; R v Loveridge [2001] EWCA Crim 973, [2001] 2 Cr App R 29 (p. 591); R v Button [2005] EWCA
Crim 516.
42 R v Hardy [2002] EWCA Crim 3012, [2003] 1 Cr App R 30 (p. 494) at [19].
43 See generally A. L.-T. Choo, ‘Halting Criminal Prosecutions: The Abuse of Process Doctrine
Revisited’ [1995] Crim LR 864; A. L.-T. Choo, Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays of Criminal Proceedings
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1993); D. Corker and D. Young, Abuse of Process in Criminal Proceedings, 2nd
edn (Butterworths: London, 2003); C. Wells, Abuse of Process: A Practical Approach (Legal Action Group:
London, 2006).
delay,44 prejudicial pre-trial publicity45 or the loss of relevant material by the
prosecution.46 In recent years the abuse of process doctrine has also been used to
stay proceedings even where there is no suggestion that the trial itself would be
unfair. This second limb of the doctrine is usually reserved for cases where the
actions of the authorities are such that it would be ‘an affront to the public
conscience’ to allow the prosecution to proceed.47 It is accepted that in some
circumstances ‘certainty of guilt cannot displace the essential feature of this kind
of abuse of process, namely the degradation of the lawful administration of
justice’.48 In R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p. Bennett,49 the House of Lords
held that the power to stay proceedings as an abuse of process could be used in
unlawful rendition cases where the authorities had acted in blatant disregard of
international law. The court’s jurisdiction to halt proceedings in these circum-
stances exists because ‘the judiciary accept a responsibility for the maintenance of
the rule of law that embraces a willingness to oversee executive action and to
refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the
rule of law’.50 The Court of Appeal has noted that:
it seems to us that Bennett-type abuse, where it would be offensive to
justice and propriety to try the defendant at all, is different ... from the
type of abuse which renders a fair trial impossible ... It arises not from
the relationship between the prosecution and the defendant, but
from the relationship between the prosecution and the Court. It arises
from the Court’s need to exercise control over executive involvement
in the whole prosecution process, not limited to the trial itself.51
The second limb of the abuse of process doctrine has also been applied in cases of
improper entrapment on the ground that it would be unacceptable to prosecute a
case where the authorities have instigated the crime. A stay of proceedings is
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44 R v S [2006] EWCA Crim 756, [2006] 2 Cr App R 23 (p. 341).
45 R v Taylor (1994) 98 Cr App R 361 (decision of 1993).
46 R v Beckford [1996] 1 Cr App R 94.
47 R v Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 at 112. In appropriate cases ‘the judge must weigh in the balance the
public interest in ensuring that those that are charged with grave crimes should be tried and the
competing public interest in not conveying the impression that the court will adopt the approach
that the end justified any means’ (ibid. at 113).
48 R v Mullen [1999] 2 Cr App R 143 at 155.
49 [1994] 1 AC 42.
50 Ibid. at 62, per Lord Griffiths. See generally C. Gane and S. Nash, ‘Illegal Extradition: The Irregular
Return of Fugitive Offenders’ (1996) 1 Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly 277.
51 R v Mullen [1999] 2 Cr App R 143 at 158.
regarded as the appropriate solution in these cases rather than excluding
evidence obtained by entrapment under s. 78(1).52
Traditionally, the discretion to stay proceedings, which can involve, under its
second limb, balancing competing interests to determine whether it would be an
affront to the public conscience to allow the prosecution to continue, was not
considered to share the same juridical basis as the exclusionary discretion
provided by s. 78(1). Auld LJ remarked in R v Chalkley:
The determination of the fairness or otherwise of admitting evidence
under s. 78 is distinct from the exercise of discretion in determining
whether to stay criminal proceedings as an abuse of process.
Depending on the circumstances, the latter may require consider-
ation, not just of the potential fairness of a trial, but also of a balance
of the possibly countervailing interests of prosecuting a criminal to
conviction and discouraging abuse of power.53
In A and Others, however, it was argued before the House of Lords that obtaining
evidence by torture was such a serious breach of international standards that the
admission of the evidence would, regardless of its reliability, degrade the adminis-
tration of justice. Consequently, it would be appropriate for a court to exercise its
discretion to exclude the evidence on the basis that its admission would constitute
an abuse of the process of the court. The House of Lords unanimously agreed. Lord
Hoffmann noted that:
the law has moved on. English law has developed a principle … that
the courts will not shut their eyes to the way the accused was brought
before the court or the evidence of his guilt was obtained. Those
methods may be such that it would compromise the integrity of the
judicial process, dishonour the administration of justice, if the
proceedings were to be entertained or the evidence admitted. In such
a case the proceedings may be stayed or the evidence rejected on the
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52 R v Looseley [2001] UKHL 53, [2001] 1 WLR 2060. See generally A. Ashworth, ‘Re-Drawing the
Boundaries of Entrapment’ [2002] Crim LR 161; D. Ormerod and A. Roberts, ‘The Trouble with
Teixeira: Developing a Principled Approach to Entrapment’ (2002) 6 E & P 38; D. Squires, ‘The
Problem with Entrapment’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 351.
53 [1998] 2 All ER 155 at 178. In his Review of the Criminal Courts Auld called for an investigation into
the interplay between s. 78(1) and the abuse of process doctrine: Lord Justice Auld, A Review of the
Criminal Courts of England and Wales (TSO: London, 2001) ch. 11, para. 111, accessible via
www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk, last accessed 12 March 2007.
ground that there would otherwise be an abuse of the processes of the
court.54
In the words of Lord Carswell, ‘the duty not to countenance the use of torture by
admission of evidence so obtained in judicial proceedings must be regarded as
paramount and … to allow its admission would shock the conscience, abuse or
degrade the proceedings and involve the state in moral defilement’.55
The decision in A and Others represents an acknowledgement that there may be
circumstances in which a court should be prepared, ‘on moral grounds’,56 to
exclude reliable evidence because of the manner in which it was obtained. It may
signify a recognition that the mismatch between the courts’ divergent approaches
to exclusion of improperly obtained evidence and stays for abuse of process has
finally been laid to rest, and that integrity considerations do have a role to play in
determinations of exclusion. Yet what is remarkable is that the House of Lords has
achieved this reconciliation by casually uncovering a common law principle of
exclusion that had previously been thought not to exist, and thereby extending
the reach of Ex p. Bennett into the realm of evidential exclusion.
2. Australia
The traditional Australian approach to the exclusion of improperly obtained but
reliable evidence57 is neatly encapsulated in the following extra-judicial statement
by the Chief Justice of New South Wales: ‘The discretion to exclude evidence
illegally or improperly obtained serves public policy objectives other than the
principle of a fair trial.’58 The High Court of Australia recognised the existence at
common law of a specific judicial discretion to exclude improperly obtained
evidence which was meant to reflect the fact that convictions obtained on the
basis of such evidence ‘may be obtained at too high a price’.59 This discretion
involves:
the weighing against each other of two competing requirements of
public policy, thereby seeking to resolve the apparent conflict
between the desirable goal of bringing to conviction the wrongdoer
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55 Ibid. at [150].
56 Ibid. at [148], per Lord Carswell.
57 See generally B. Selway, ‘Principle, Public Policy and Unfairness—Exclusion of Evidence on Discre-
tionary Grounds’ (2002) 23 Adelaide Law Review 1.
58 Hon. J. J. Spigelman AC, ‘The Truth Can Cost Too Much: The Principle of a Fair Trial’ (2004) 78
Australian Law Journal 29 at 38.
59 R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 335, per Barwick CJ.
and the undesirable effect of curial approval, or even encouragement,
being given to the unlawful conduct of those whose task it is to
enforce the law.60
Such a discretion is considered to be independent of the right to a fair trial. Trial
fairness is not regarded as the appropriate legal concept by reference to which to
attempt to secure the exclusion of ‘what might loosely be called “real evidence”,
such as articles found by search, recordings of conversations, the result of
breathalyzer tests, fingerprint evidence and so on’. According to the High Court of
Australia:
‘Fair’ or ‘unfair’ is largely meaningless when considering fingerprint
evidence obtained by force or a trick or even the evidence of
possession of, say, explosives or weapons obtained by an unlawful
search of body or baggage, aided by electronic scanners.61
To admit evidence obtained as a result of ‘the unlawful search of person or
premises’, for example, cannot, if the evidence is reliable, have the potential to
lead to an unfair trial. Thus it cannot compromise trial fairness ‘to use, against a
person accused of having in his possession weapons or explosives, evidence
obtained by means of an unlawful body search so long … as that search is so
conducted as to provide all proper safeguards against weapons or explosives being
“planted” on the accused in the course of the search’.62 The judicial discretion to
exclude improperly obtained evidence, rather, is rooted in the responsibility of
courts to protect their own integrity and that of the criminal justice system as a
whole. As the High Court of Australia remarked in the context of considering a
breach of certain legislative safeguards:
These safeguards the executive, and, of course, the police forces,
should not be free to disregard. Were there to occur wholesale and
deliberate disregard of these safeguards its toleration by the courts
would result in the effective abrogation of the legislature’s safeguards
of individual liberties, subordinating it to the executive arm. This
would not be excusable however desirable might be the immediate
end in view, that of convicting the guilty. … Moreover the courts
should not be seen to be acquiescent in the face of the unlawful
conduct of those whose task it is to enforce the law. On the other hand
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62 Ibid. at 77. See also R v Swaffield [1998] HCA 1 at [54], [70], per Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ.
it may be quite inappropriate to treat isolated and merely accidental
non-compliance with statutory safeguards as leading to inadmissi-
bility of the resultant evidence when of their very nature they involve
no overt defiance of the will of the legislature or calculated disregard
of the common law and when the reception of the evidence thus
provided does not demean the court as a tribunal whose concern is in
upholding the law.63
Three Australian jurisdictions have passed virtually identical Acts of Parliament
that provide a comprehensive statement of substantial parts of the law of
evidence. These are the Evidence Act 1995 (Commonwealth) (which applies not
only in the Commonwealth jurisdiction but also in the courts of the Australian
Capital Territory), the Evidence Act 1995 (New South Wales) (applicable in the state
of New South Wales) and the Evidence Act 2001 (Tasmania) (applicable in the state
of Tasmania).64 Section 138 of the Uniform Evidence Acts (as the Acts are collec-
tively known) provides:
(1) Evidence that was obtained:
(a) improperly or in contravention of an Australian law; or
(b) in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an
Australian law;
is not to be admitted unless the desirability of admitting the evidence
outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been
obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained.
…
(3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account
under subsection (1), it is to take into account:
(a) the probative value of the evidence; and
(b) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding; and
(c) the nature of the relevant offence, cause of action or defence and
the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and
(d) the gravity of the impropriety or contravention; and
(e) whether the impropriety or contravention was deliberate or
reckless; and
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Commentary on the Uniform Evidence Acts (Butterworths: Sydney, 2002).
(f) whether the impropriety or contravention was contrary to or
inconsistent   with   a   right   of   a   person   recognised   by   the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and
(g) whether any other proceeding (whether or not in a court) has
been or is likely to be taken in relation to the impropriety or
contravention; and
(h) the difficulty (if any) of obtaining the evidence without
impropriety or contravention of an Australian law.
No guidance is provided in the legislation on the relative weighting to be accorded
to the matters specified, or on the way in which they are to be taken to relate to
one another. At common law, by contrast, the High Court of Australia provided
specific guidance on the manner in which the probative value (cogency) and the
importance of the evidence ought to be taken into account in the exercise of
judicial discretion, also emphasising situations where neither cogency nor impor-
tance would suffice to condone deliberate rule-breaking:
To treat cogency of evidence as a factor favouring admission, where
the illegality in obtaining it has been either deliberate or reckless,
may serve to foster the quite erroneous view that if such evidence be
but damning enough that will of itself suffice to atone for the
illegality involved in procuring it. For this reason cogency should,
generally, be allowed to play no part in the exercise of discretion
where the illegality involved in procuring it is intentional or reckless.
To this there will no doubt be exceptions: for example where the
evidence is both vital to conviction and is of a perishable or
evanescent nature, so that if there be any delay in securing it, it will
have ceased to exist.
Where … the illegality arises only from mistake, and is neither delib-
erate nor reckless, cogency is one of the factors to which regard
should be had. It bears upon one of the competing policy consider-
ations, the desirability of bringing wrongdoers to conviction.65
Again, ‘the nature of the relevant offence’ appears in s. 138(3)(c) as a compulsory
consideration with no guidance on the manner in which it is to be taken into
account. As a member of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
remarked:
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There are two opposing ways in which the gravity of the charge may
be taken into account and may be relevant. It is, obviously, in the
interests of the community that persons guilty of more serious
offences be dealt with according to law. As a general proposition,
the more serious the charge, the greater the community interest in
the conviction and punishment of the guilty. On the other hand, it
may equally be said that the more serious the charge faced, the
more rigorous should be the insistence on adherence to statutory
provisions enacted to protect the rights of individuals. Section 138
affords no guidance as to whether the requirement that ‘the nature of
the relevant offence’ be taken into account in the balancing exercise
demanded by s. 138(1) points towards greater leniency or greater
strictness in the enforcement of legal requirements.66
The position at common law, by contrast, is clear: the more serious the offence
charged the more likely the evidence should be admitted. This was exemplified by
the High Court of Australia in the leading case of Bunning v Cross, where admissi-
bility was said to depend on the nature of the particular offence in question:
A[n] … important factor is the nature of the offence charged. While
[drink-driving] is not one of the most serious crimes it is one with
which Australian legislatures have been much concerned in recent
years and the commission of which may place in jeopardy the lives of
other users of the highway who quite innocently use it for their lawful
purposes. Some examination of the comparative seriousness of the
offence and of the unlawful conduct of the law enforcement
authority is an element in the process required …67
The generally accepted position is that s. 138(3)(c) should be interpreted in the
same way, although an interesting minority view was expressed by one member of
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal:
In my opinion it would be wrong to accept as a general proposition
that, because the offence charged is a serious one, breaches of the law
will be more readily condoned. In my judgment there may be cases
in which the fact that the charge is a serious one will result in a
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more rigorous insistence on compliance with statutory provisions
concerning the obtaining of evidence.68
The Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform
Commission and Victorian Law Reform Commission concluded, in the light of
their recent review of the Uniform Evidence Acts, that the prevailing approach to
the interpretation of s. 138(3)(c) was correct and unproblematic.69 More generally,
the Commissions considered that while ‘some concern is expressed that it is
unclear how [the] factors [articulated in s. 138(3)] should be applied and what
weight should be given to them, … it would be inappropriate to attempt to guide
the balancing test legislatively. This is particularly so given that the weight to be
given to any particular factors listed in s. 138(3) will vary depending on which of
the other factors in that subsection arise in the context of a particular case.’70
Presser undertook empirical research on Australian cases from the mid-1980s
until 1999 in which attempts were made to secure the exclusion of evidence on the
ground that it had been obtained improperly. Some 39 cases were examined in
total, covering all types of allegedly improperly obtained evidence, including
confession evidence. In six of the 39 cases the evidence was excluded by the trial
court. Some 26 of these 39 cases went on appeal. In only three of the 26 cases did
the appellate court hold that the evidence should have been excluded. Presser
notes:
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 91
IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN THE COMMONWEALTH
68 R v Dalley [2002] NSWCCA 284 at [97], per Simpson J. The other two judges took the orthodox view.
Spigelman CJ said (ibid. at [3]): ‘In the case of criminal proceedings, in my opinion, the public
interest in admitting evidence varies directly with the gravity of the offence. The more serious the
offence, the more likely it is that the public interest requires the admission of the evidence.’
Blanch AJ ‘agree[d] with the remarks of the Chief Justice that the public interest in conviction and
punishment can be expected to have greater weight in crimes of greater gravity …’: ibid. at [102].
69 Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 102 (Australian Law Reform
Commission: Sydney, 2005) [16.95]: ‘Submissions and consultations express some concern
regarding the majority interpretation of this provision. … the Commissions are of the view that the
correct approach is that the more serious the offence, the more weight should be given to the
public interest in admitting evidence which might result in the apprehension of criminal
offenders. However, this does not mean that breaches of the law will necessarily be condoned
where the offence is a serious one. The nature of the offence is only one of the factors which the
court is to take into account in the exercise of this discretion. Whether illegally or improperly
obtained evidence is admitted will also depend on factors such as the nature of the impropriety or
illegality. Where the infringement involves isolated or accidental non-compliance, the weight to
be given to the nature of the offence may be greater than if the infringement involves a serious and
deliberate breach of procedure. Hence, the fact that the offence charged is serious is by no means
determinative of how the discretion in s. 138 will be exercised.’
70 Ibid. at [16.93].
In almost all jurisdictions, there appears to be a significant degree of
tolerance of police misconduct, such that judges are willing to give
police a high degree of latitude in the conduct of their criminal inves-
tigations.
Often judges will refuse to even classify the alleged misconduct as
unlawful. Yet, even when judges are willing to classify police conduct
as such, they will often find the misconduct to have only been
accidental and not deliberate or reckless. In so doing, they greatly
lessen the likelihood of the evidence obtained as a result of that
misconduct being excluded.71
The latitude extended to police investigations was found to be especially
pronounced in drug-trafficking cases.72 Strikingly, Presser’s conclusion overall
was that:
judicial latitude seems to have increased in NSW since the intro-
duction of the uniform evidence legislation … It may be speculated
that the fact that evidence obtained illegally is now prima facie
inadmissible is, at least in part, responsible for the heightened
tolerance of police misconduct amongst NSW judges, particularly
those at trial level. If the proper exercise of the discretion requires
that judges start from a position of inadmissibility, it is easier for
judges to avoid having to consider the issue altogether by classifying
the conduct as lawful. This allows judges to substantively continue
the pre-uniform evidence legislation trend of admitting contested
evidence in the balance of competing public policy interests.73
This impact is ironic in view of the fact that the Australian Law Reform
Commission, on whose work the Uniform Evidence Acts were based, envisaged
that placing the onus on the prosecution would increase the incidence of
exclusion.74
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71 B. Presser, ‘Public Policy, Police Interest: A Re-Evaluation of the Judicial Discretion to Exclude
Improperly or Illegally Obtained Evidence’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 757 at 777.
72 Ibid. at 779.
73 Ibid. at 778 (italics added).
74 Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence, ALRC 26 (Interim) vol. 1 (Australian Government
Publishing Service: Canberra, 1985) [964]: ‘Those who infringe the law should be required to justify
their actions and thus bear the onus of persuading the judge not to exclude the evidence so
obtained. Practical considerations support this approach. Evidence is not often excluded under the
[common law] discretion. This suggests that the placing of the onus on the accused leans too
heavily on the side of crime control considerations.’
To update Presser’s study (albeit without replicating his more systematic
empirical methodology), we conducted a cursory search for decisions in which
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has considered s. 138 in some
detail since 2000. We limited our investigation to non-confession evidence
alleged to have been obtained in breach of rules relating to stops, entry,
search, seizure or detention.75 Four such decisions were found. Three of these—R v
Chen,76 R v McKeough77 and O’Meara v R78—provide instances of the tendency,
identified by Presser, to classify conduct as lawful and thus avoid applying s. 138.
In R v Rondo, however, where the ‘amount of illegal conduct in obtaining evidence
[was] significant’,79 the court thought that it could not ‘be said that the desirability
of admitting the evidence improperly and unlawfully obtained outweighs the
undesirability of admitting that evidence’.80 The court was clearly influenced by
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76 [2002] NSWCCA 174. The court stated (ibid. at [21]): ‘It seems to us to be … clear that the Uniana was
within Australian territorial waters at the time it was actually boarded and searched, and at the
times at which, subsequently, persons were arrested and items were seized. It seems to us to follow
necessarily that the actual boarding, the actual search, the actual arrests, and the actual seizures
were all lawful at the times at which, respectively, they took place. … Even if it be granted that
there was some such irregularity deriving from things occurring outside the strict nautical limit of
Australian territorial waters, the result cannot be, in our opinion, to make unlawful the seizure
and search within Australian waters of the particular vessel. All that follows from such an irregu-
larity occurring outside the territorial limit is that the lawful seizure and search were
accomplished only as a result of the antecedent irregularity. That cannot, [in] our view, make the
seizure and search itself unlawful … Further, even if the actual boarding, the actual search, the
actual arrests and the actual seizures were unlawful, as the trial judge was prepared to assume
contrary to his primary approach, he was right to conclude that the desirability of admitting the
evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting it for the reasons which he gave, namely the
“extraordinarily high” probative value of the evidence, the importance of the evidence, the
seriousness of the offences, the understandable and non-deliberate character of the contravention
and the difficulty of obtaining the evidence without the contravention alleged.’
77 [2003] NSWCCA 385 at [33], [34], per Dunford J: ‘… I am satisfied that [the trial judge] was in error in
finding that the search of the vehicle was illegal and, therefore, there was no ground for excluding
the evidence of the finding of the drugs … However, on the hypothesis that the search of the vehicle
was illegal, I am still satisfied that his Honour was in error in excluding the evidence.’ Spigelman
CJ took the view that ‘there was no basis for the search of the vehicle … and, accordingly, the
evidence had been obtained as a consequence of impropriety or contravention, within the
meaning of s. 138(1)’ (ibid. at [52]), but concluded, ‘on balance, that the alternative way in which
Dunford J outlined in his reasons, namely, on the assumption that there was illegality, is justified’
(ibid. at [59]). Hidden J (ibid. at [61]) found it ‘unnecessary to determine whether the search was
legal. It is sufficient to say that I agree that [the trial judge] does not appear to have performed the
balancing act that s. 138 of the Act requires.’
78 [2006] NSWCCA 131 at [100], per Simpson J: ‘There was nothing unlawful or improper about the
entry by police. Accordingly, there is no call for this Court to consider whether the s. 138 test had
been met.’
79 [2001] NSWCCA 540 at [137], per Smart AJ.
80 Ibid. at [138].
the cumulative gravity of the misconduct,81 but did not engage in any detailed
discussion of the relevant factors to be considered.
3. Canada
The contemporary approach to improperly obtained evidence in Canada is encap-
sulated in s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides:
Where … a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner
that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having
regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
The judicial approach to the interpretation of s. 24(2)82 can be summarised as
follows. ‘Disrepute’ is effectively to be interpreted objectively:
The concept of disrepute necessarily involves some element of
community views, and the determination of disrepute thus requires
the judge to refer to what he conceives to be the views of the
community at large. This does not mean that evidence of the public’s
perception of the repute of the administration of justice … will be
determinative of the issue … Members of the public generally become
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(2001) 80 Canadian Bar Review 433; J. Parfett, ‘A Triumph of Liberalism: The Supreme Court of
Canada and the Exclusion of Evidence’ (2002) 40 Alberta Law Review 299; S. Penney, ‘Taking
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Charter’ (2004) 49 McGill Law Journal 105; M. C. Plaxton, ‘Who Needs Section 24(2)? Or: Common Law
Sleight-of-Hand’ (2003) 10 Criminal Reports (6th) 236; D. Stuart, ‘Buhay: No Automatic Inclusionary
Rule under Section 24(2) When Evidence is Non-Conscripted and Essential to Crown’s Case’ (2003)
10 Criminal Reports (6th) 233; D. Stuart, ‘Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero’ (1998) 13 Criminal
Reports (5th) 50; D. Stuart, ‘Stillman: Limiting Search Incident to Arrest, Consent Searches and
Refining the Section 24(2) Test’ (1997) 5 Criminal Reports (5th) 99.
conscious of the importance of protecting the rights and freedoms of
accused only when they are in some way brought closer to the system
either personally or through the experience of friends or family. … The
approach … may be put figuratively in terms of [a] reasonable person
test … The reasonable person is usually the average person in the
community, but only when that community’s current mood is
reasonable. 83
The judge must try to discern a political community’s reflective preferences,
purged of any transitory enthusiasms or emotional outbursts:
[T]he judge … should not render a decision that would be
unacceptable to the community when that community is not being
wrought with passion or otherwise under passing stress due to
current events.84
In contrast with the position in Australia under the Uniform Evidence Acts, the
onus in Canada lies with the defendant: ‘the use of the phrase “if it is established
that” places the burden of persuasion on the applicant, for it is the position which he
maintains which must be established. … [T]he applicant must [establish that it is]
more probable than not that the admission of the evidence would bring the adminis-
tration of justice into disrepute.’85
There are two ways in which ‘disrepute’ may be caused by the admission of
evidence obtained as a result of a Charter violation. First, if the evidence is
conscriptive evidence, its admission may result in an unfair trial, such that ‘the
evidence must be excluded’.86 Conscriptive evidence essentially comprises confes-
sions and evidence obtained from the accused in a manner analogous to obtaining
his or her confession. Thus:
Evidence will be conscriptive when an accused, in violation of his
Charter rights, is compelled to incriminate himself at the behest of
the state by means of a statement, the use of the body or the
production of bodily samples. The traditional and most frequently
encountered example of this type of evidence is a self-incriminating
statement made by the accused following a violation of his right to
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counsel … The other example is the compelled taking and use of
the body or of bodily substances of the accused, such as blood, which
lead to self-incrimination. It is the compelled statements or the
conscripted use of bodily substances obtained in violation of Charter
rights which may render a trial unfair.87
In determining whether the admission of the evidence will result in an unfair
trial, the primary considerations for the court are ‘the nature of the evidence
obtained as a result of the violation and the nature of the right violated’.88 The view
is taken that ‘the admission of evidence, which was obtained following the
breach of an accused’s Charter rights resulting in the accused being compelled
or conscripted to incriminate himself by a statement or the use as evidence of his
body or bodily substances will, as a general rule, be found to render the trial
unfair’.89 The concept of trial fairness subscribed to by the Supreme Court of
Canada therefore includes, but is not limited to, concerns about the reliability of
evidence. The seriousness of the offence charged is not a relevant consideration
in determining the issue of trial fairness: ‘if the admission of the evidence would
result in an unfair trial, the seriousness of the offence could not render that
evidence admissible. If any relevance is to be given to the seriousness of the
offence in the context of the fairness of the trial, it operates in the opposite sense:
the more serious the offence, the more damaging to the system’s repute would be
an unfair trial.’90
Secondly, in the case of non-conscriptive evidence obtained in breach of the Charter,
‘disrepute’ resulting ‘from judicial condonation of unacceptable conduct by the
investigatory and prosecutorial agencies’ must be weighed against ‘any disrepute
that may result from the exclusion of the evidence’.91 The concept of disrepute is
capable of justifying the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence, but also of
mandating its admission notwithstanding the taint of impropriety. As the Supreme
Court elaborated:
It would be inconsistent with the purpose of s. 24(2) to exclude
evidence if its exclusion would bring the administration of justice
into greater disrepute than would its admission. [Additionally], it
must be emphasized that even though the inquiry under s. 24(2) will
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necessarily focus on the specific prosecution, it is the long-term conse-
quences of regular admission or exclusion of this type of evidence
on the repute of the administration of justice which must be
considered.92
Factors regarded as relevant for the trial court to consider may include the
following:
• Was the Charter violation serious or was it of a merely technical
nature?
• Was it deliberate, wilful or flagrant, or was it inadvertent or committed
in good faith?
• Did it occur in circumstances of urgency or necessity?
• Were there other investigatory techniques available?
• Would the evidence have been obtained in any event?
• Is the offence serious?
• Is the evidence essential to substantiate the charge?93
Setting aside the robust approach to be taken to conscriptive evidence, the
possible exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is therefore to be determined
by reference to ‘integrity’ concerns and by the application of a broad balancing
test. It may be inappropriate for a court, whose duty it is to uphold the law, effec-
tively to condone improprieties committed in the course of enforcing it. This is
analogous to the Australian approach outlined earlier, and to the approach taken
in England and Wales to the second limb of the abuse of process doctrine.
Notwithstanding the presumption of admissibility that must be rebutted by the
defendant, Canadian courts have been willing to use the exclusionary power in
s. 24(2) in relation to non-conscriptive evidence. An empirical study conducted by
Gorham surveyed all reported Supreme Court, appellate court and trial court
decisions concerning evidential exclusion in relation to breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of
the Canadian Charter during the period January 1998 to November 2002.94 Section
8 guarantees ‘the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure’ while
s. 9 guarantees ‘the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned’. Gorham
found that non-conscripted evidence obtained in violation of s. 8 or s. 9 was
excluded in approximately half of the 148 reported decisions in his survey. The
rate of exclusion was virtually the same in prosecutions for drug offences (53 per
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cent) as for all prosecutions (51 per cent). He concluded that ‘s. 24(2) of the Charter
is being applied with a good measure of discretion and the seriousness of drug
offences does not automatically override the seriousness of the breach’.95 Interest-
ingly, ‘evidence in prosecutions involving serious narcotics [was] excluded more
frequently than in prosecutions involving marijuana’.96 ‘One possible explanation’,
according to Gorham, was that ‘many of the reported decisions involving
marijuana were prosecutions for cultivation’.97
These findings are reinforced by recent jurisprudence from the Canadian
Supreme Court. R v Law concerned the photocopying of financial documents
found in a safe without first obtaining a warrant. Bastarache J, delivering the
single judgment of the entire nine-member court, held that this constituted a
violation of s. 8 of the Charter, and furthermore that the photocopied documents
should be excluded from evidence under s. 24(2). This decision was explicitly predi-
cated on upholding the integrity of pre-trial criminal process. As the court
reasoned:
[A]dmitting the evidence would not affect the fairness of the trial (it
being real, discoverable, non-conscripted evidence), yet excluding the
evidence would compromise the Crown’s case. The resolution of s.
24(2) thus turns on … whether the violation of s. 8 is so serious that it
outweighs the State’s interest in admitting the evidence.98
In this case, the court thought, the administration of justice would be brought
into ‘far greater disrepute’ by the admission of the evidence than by its
exclusion.99
To similar effect is R v Buhay,100 which concerned the search of a bus depot locker
without a search warrant, and the consequent seizure of marijuana. Arbour J,
again delivering a unanimous nine-member opinion, held that this warrantless
search was an ‘impermissible intrusion of the state on a legitimate and reasonable
expectation of privacy’ which violated s. 8 of the Charter.101 But this was not suffi-
cient in itself to render the trial unfair:
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In the present case, [the trial judge] was correct in concluding that
admission of the marijuana seized following the search of locker 135
does not affect adjudicative fairness. The appellant has not been
conscripted against himself in the creation of evidence and the
evidence pre-existed the violation of the Charter. Furthermore, the
evidence was clearly ‘discoverable’ without any infringement of
Charter rights. Thus, as the marijuana is non-conscriptive,
‘discoverable’ evidence, its admission would not render the trial
unfair.102
The Supreme Court emphasised the need for trial judges to arrive at a fully
contextualised decision, taking proper account of all circumstantially relevant
factors: ‘Section 24(2) is not an automatic exclusionary rule … neither should it
become an automatic inclusionary rule when the evidence is non-conscriptive and
essential to the Crown’s case’.103 This provision instead demarcates a sphere of
‘discretionary power’ delegated to trial judges by the Charter:
The decision to exclude evidence always represents a balance between
the interests of truth on one side and the integrity of the judicial
system on the other … The trial judge concluded that the vindication
of the Charter breach in this case, which was serious, did not extract
too great a toll on the truth seeking goal of the criminal justice
system. In light of his concern as to the long-term effect of the law
enforcement officers’ attitude in this case, it was well within [his]
judicial discretionary power to conclude that the admission of the
marijuana in this case would cause greater disrepute to the justice
system than its exclusion would, and such decision is very well within
the limits of reasonableness.104
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102 Ibid. at [51].
103 Ibid. at [71].
104 Ibid. at [73]. See also R v Chaisson [2006] 1 SCR 415 (evidence of finding of marijuana in car): ‘… we
are satisfied that the trial judge was entitled, on the facts as he found them, to conclude that the
appellant’s rights under ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter had been violated. We are satisfied as
well that the trial judge committed no reviewable error in concluding that the cumulative effect
of these violations warranted exclusion of the impugned evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.’
(Ibid. at [7], per Fish J, delivering the judgment of the court.) (Section 10(b) guarantees
everyone ‘the right on arrest or detention to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be
informed of that right’.)
4. New Zealand
The introduction in New Zealand of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 led to
the creation by the courts of a prima facie rule of exclusion of evidence obtained in
breach of the Act. Evidence could be admitted as an exception to this rule only
where there was ‘good reason’ to do so, a concept that seemed to be interpreted
restrictively. It appeared that ‘good reason’ could be demonstrated, for example,
by circumstances of urgency in which the breach occurred or by the triviality of
the breach. It could not be demonstrated merely by the probative value or cogency
of the evidence, the importance of the evidence or the seriousness of the offence
charged.105
In R v Shaheed106 in 2002, however, the New Zealand Court of Appeal decisively
rejected the prima facie rule, on the basis that presumptive exclusion was both
insufficiently flexible and failed to strike an appropriate balance between
competing interests in criminal adjudication:
Importantly, a prima facie rule does not have the appearance of
adequately addressing the interest of the community that those who
are guilty of serious crimes should not go unpunished. That societal
interest, in which any victim’s interest is subsumed, rather than
being treated as a separate interest, will not normally outweigh an
egregious breach of rights—particularly one which is deliberate or
reckless on the part of law enforcement officers. But where the
disputed evidence is strongly probative of guilt of a serious crime,
that factor too must be given due weight. A system of justice will not
command the respect of the community if each and every substantial
breach of an accused’s rights leads almost inevitably to the exclusion
of crucial evidence which is reliable and probative of a serious crime.
The vindication will properly be seen as unbalanced and dispropor-
tionate to the circumstances of the breach. Nor does a presumptive
rule seem entirely consistent with the concept of a specific tailoring
of remedies to the circumstances of the particular case …107
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106 [2002] 2 NZLR 377. See generally J. Ip, ‘The End of the Prima Facie Exclusionary Rule’ (2002) 9
Auckland University Law Review 1016; R. Mahoney, ‘Abolition of New Zealand’s Prima Facie
Exclusionary Rule’ [2003] Crim LR 607.
107 [2002] 2 NZLR 377 at [143], per Richardson P and Blanchard and Tipping JJ.
Having discarded the prima facie test, the New Zealand Court of Appeal proffered
the following advice to trial judges who are confronted by defence applications to
exclude evidence obtained through official impropriety:
[W]here there has been a breach of a right guaranteed to a suspect by
the Bill of Rights, a Judge who is asked to exclude resulting evidence
must determine whether that is a response which is proportionate to
the character of such a breach of the right in question. The Judge must
make that determination by means of a balancing process in which
the starting point is to give appropriate and significant weight to the
existence of that breach but which also takes proper account of the
need for an effective and credible system of justice.108
It is notable from an English perspective that s. 25(a) of the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990, which guarantees the right to a ‘fair and public hearing’ in
identical terms to Article 6 of the European Convention, did not feature at all in
the court’s discussion in Shaheed.
The New Zealand Court of Appeal expressed the hope that its ruling in Shaheed
would ‘lead to a judicial technique which involves a greater exercise of judgment
than the previous focus on a “prima facie rule” may have encouraged’, whilst at
the same time maintaining that this new approach ‘should not lead, in most cases,
to results different from those envisaged in earlier judgments of this Court’.109
Whilst its impact ‘in most cases’ remains to be seen, an impressionistic view110
tends to confirm the Court of Appeal’s prediction. There have been four
post-Shaheed decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in which the court held
non-confession evidence of undisputed reliability to have been obtained in breach
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. In three of these four cases the court
went on to hold that exclusion was justified on the application of the Shaheed
approach. For example, R v Maihi involved a breach of s. 21 of the Act, which
guarantees ‘the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise’. The court expressed its
conclusion in clear and confident terms:
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108 Ibid. at [156].
109 Ibid.
110 Gained from a search of the Nzlii database: www.nzlii.org, last accessed 12 March 2007. See also
C. Danswan, ‘New Zealand’s Evidence Exclusionary Rule: Assessment of R v Shaheed in 2003’ (2004)
10 Auckland University Law Review 174, in which it is demonstrated that post-Shaheed case law
displays a careful consideration by the courts of the Shaheed test.
Although the case can be seen as coming quite close to the borderline,
we consider there is not enough weight in the public interest side of
the scales to outweigh the starting point, which is to give appropriate
and significant weight to the fact that Mr Maihi’s s. 21 rights were
breached. The public interest in prosecuting him for the drug offences
with which he is charged does not, in our judgment, outweigh the
starting point and the features associated with it. Relief by exclusion
of the evidence is not disproportionate to the breach. The vindication
of Mr Maihi’s rights in this the only appropriate way does not
undermine the need to maintain a credible and effective system of
criminal justice. It follows that in our view the Judge below was in
error in his conclusion that the evidence should be admitted.111
Decisions to exclude improperly obtained evidence were likewise reached in R v
Ihaka112 and R v Rollinson.113 In the fourth case, however, where the police had
conducted an unlawful search of a ‘lockup’ storage shed, the court held:
In our view the application of the balancing exercise mandated by
Shaheed leads to the conclusion that the evidence ought to be admitted
in this case, notwithstanding the unlawful and unreasonable search.
The actions of the police, while unlawful, were not in any way delib-
erate or cavalier. The evidence is essential to the prosecution for serious
offending. The invasion of privacy was serious, but substantially less
serious than an unlawful search of a residence or vehicle. We conclude,
therefore, that the evidence is admissible at trial.114
The early indications are that exclusion is a probable, but by no means invariable,
response to improperly obtained evidence under Shaheed. A contextualised
approach is hardly surprising. After all, even the now-disfavoured prima facie
exclusionary rule could be rebutted in appropriate cases.
5. What lessons for England and Wales?
Leaving aside the decision in A and Others, English law, we have seen, steadfastly
clings to the idea that trial fairness remains the sole test for determining whether
improperly obtained, but apparently reliable, evidence ought to be excluded. In
both domestic jurisprudence and the jurisprudence of the European Court of
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111 [2002] NZCA 205 at [38].
112 [2002] NZCA 134.
113 [2003] NZCA 59.
114 R v Taylor [2006] NZCA 76 at [43].
Human Rights it is considered that the fairness of a trial may only be compromised
by the admission of evidence of doubtful reliability and, it would seem, evidence
obtained in breach of the right against self-incrimination. This is consistent with
the approach taken in the other Commonwealth jurisdictions we have examined.
The fundamental difference appears to be that major Commonwealth jurisdictions
other than England and Wales have come to recognise that broader integrity consid-
erations constitute a separate and distinct ground for exclusion.
As a further illustration, the dichotomy between ‘fair trial’ and broader integrity
concerns is very clearly encapsulated in the specific provision on unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence to be found in the South African Bill of Rights:
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of
Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would
render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the adminis-
tration of justice.115
In fact, the recognition of this dichotomy is not confined to domestic jurisdictions
in the Commonwealth. For example, the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court specifically identifies the integrity of the criminal justice system
as a distinct ground for exclusion:
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or inter-
nationally recognized human rights shall not be admissible if:
(a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the
evidence; or
(b) The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would
seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.116
Another significant insight arising from the foregoing examination of Common-
wealth jurisprudence is that adoption of an approach to improperly obtained
evidence that is apparently more pro-defence or more pro-prosecution may not
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115 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s. 35(5). See generally P. J. Schwikkard and S. E. van
der Merwe, Principles of Evidence, 2nd edn (Juta: Lansdowne, 2002) ch. 12.
116 See generally K. Vanderpuye, ‘The International Criminal Court and Discretionary Evidential
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Provisions virtually identical to this appear in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. Rule 95 of both sets of
Rules provides: ‘No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial
doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the
integrity of the proceedings.’
necessarily translate into more or less exclusion, respectively. Trying to identify
‘substance’ may be more important than simply examining ‘form’. In Australia,
the introduction of the Uniform Evidence Acts, which require the prosecution to
persuade the court to admit the impugned evidence, does not appear to have
increased the extent of exclusion in the Australian jurisdictions in which this
legislation applies. In New Zealand, the introduction of a modified approach in
2002 that is apparently more pro-prosecution does not appear to have decreased
the extent of exclusion. The announcement by the Court of Appeal of the ‘new’
approach may have reflected a contemporary concern or perceived need to appear
to be committed to crime control117 rather than a desire to see more improperly
obtained evidence in fact admitted. Canada would appear to adhere to a fairly
robust exclusionary principle despite the fact that, unlike the position in the
Australian Uniform Evidence Act jurisdictions, the onus of persuading the court
to exclude the evidence rests on the defence.
This observation suggests that, ultimately, it is not simply the test of exclusion to
be applied in a particular jurisdiction that matters. The extent to which there is an
entrenched or growing ‘rights culture’ may also be significant. The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act have accen-
tuated human rights in those jurisdictions. By contrast, in the Uniform Evidence
Act jurisdictions of Australia, with the exception of the Australian Capital
Territory,118 there are as yet no human rights norms prescribed in legislation.
England and Wales, it is true, has the Human Rights Act, but this provides a more
general statement of human rights than its Canadian and New Zealand counter-
parts. Notably, the right to privacy in Article 8 of the European Convention is
couched in general terms and does not make specific reference to search and
seizure, unlike s. 8 of the Canadian Charter or s. 21 of the New Zealand Act. This
may explain the apparently more robust response witnessed in Canada and New
Zealand to violations of procedural rules regulating search and seizure.
In England and Wales, A and Others may well herald a new approach to the problem
of improperly obtained but apparently reliable evidence. This decision acknowl-
edges that integrity considerations, long thought to be confined to abuse of
process determinations, do after all have a role to play in the context of evidential
exclusion. How, then, is this to be incorporated into the law from a doctrinal
perspective? A and Others does not provide very clear guidance, but there are
104 E & P
IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN THE COMMONWEALTH
117 It is interesting in this context to note also the suggestions in Ireland that the exclusionary
principle applicable there be watered down: www.dppireland.ie/filestore/documents/
DIRECTOR_-_Opening_Remarks.pdf, last accessed 12 March 2007.
118 Where the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) now applies.
essentially two possibilities. First, the law could replicate developments in the
other major Commonwealth jurisdictions, or in England and Wales itself in the
context of abuse of process. That is, the concept of a ‘fair trial’ could continue to be
interpreted narrowly, but on the basis that it stands alongside the power to
exclude evidence on broader, integrity-based grounds. The alternative would be to
place such broader integrity considerations under the umbrella of the ‘fair trial’
concept. It could be argued that the admission of improperly obtained evidence
might compromise trial fairness by giving the prosecution at trial ‘an advantage
which is inconsistent with the fundamental moral and political values of the
criminal justice system’. As Ian Dennis elaborates:
This advantage may be the use of evidence which is unreliable and
prejudicial, or it may be the use of evidence obtained in violation of
the accused’s human rights, or it may be evidence obtained by delib-
erate abuse of process, and so on.119
The second alternative may be superior. It would mean that a distinctive interpre-
tation of the concept of a ‘fair trial’ could be developed in England and Wales. While
this interpretation would differ fundamentally from that taken in the other major
Commonwealth jurisdictions, it would provide considerable substance to the right
to a fair trial contained in Article 6 of the European Convention. It would also facil-
itate the accommodation within English law of the implications of the decision in
A and Others. If a breach of Article 3’s absolute prohibition on torture leads to the
automatic inadmissibility of any evidence obtained in consequence of the breach, it
could be argued that contravening any Convention right should also constitute a
breach of Article 6. The right to privacy, it is true, is of a different dimension from
the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. What
should be remembered, however, is that while Article 3 guarantees an unqualified
right, Article 8 is subject to various qualifications and limitations; only unjustified
violations of the right to privacy constitute a breach of Article 8. A breach of Article 8
is therefore, by definition, a serious breach; and the same could be said of breaches
of other qualified Convention rights. Exclusion for infringing such Articles would
not therefore be inconsistent with exclusion for a breach of Article 3. Furthermore,
as recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada, the seriousness of the offence
charged has no bearing on the importance of securing a fair trial. Trials, whether of
serious or of relatively trivial offences, should always be fair. Embracing these broad
principles could point the way towards the adoption of a more robust, transparent
and coherent approach to improperly obtained evidence in England and Wales than
has prevailed in the past.
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